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As mobile devices become increasingly popular, the necessity for
both user-friendly and secure pairing methods for these devices also
rises. One natural approach to pairing devices is to match them based
on a shared experience. In this work, we define a shared experience as
the act of physically holding two devices together and shaking them
for a short period. The common movement data collected during the
shaking process can subsequently be used to verify the authenticity
of a secret key established via a key exchange protocol. This paper
explores the process of key verification using two different measures: a
coherence measure derived through time series analysis and a measure
based on Hamming distance. Using ROC curves, we show that both
of these measures robustly distinguish between the case where two
devices have been shaken together and the case where two devices
have been shaken separately.
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1 Introduction
The ability to pair two or more mobile devices is desirable for a number of
reasons. Consider two users meeting for the first time who wish to share
their contact information with the other; performing this task using their
phones can make it easy, quick, and free from human error (such as acci-
dentally saving the wrong information). Of course, these users can connect
their devices through a wireless network to perform such an exchange, but
this approach makes the users’ information vulnerable to adversarial attacks
called man-in-the-middle attacks. Man-in-the-middle attacks can be passive
attacks where the adversary simply listens in on the conversation between
the two users, or they can be active where the adversary takes control of
the entire interaction, posing as user A from user B’s perspective and user B
from user A’s perspective, while the users remain unaware that they are not
in fact communicating with the intended party. Although passive attacks
are easily countered using encryption, authentication is needed to protect
against active attacks.
A natural way to authenticate a mobile device is to require the user to
provide secret information as proof of their identity, and for obvious reasons,
it is preferable to do so with minimal user overhead. Using a password re-
quires users both to remember information and to enter it correctly when
prompted. This overhead can be reduced by allowing the user to create a
one-time password based on data collected by the device; this way, users do
not have to remember or enter any information themselves. It is important
that this data is not collected in a predictable way. Given a predictable
data collection method, it would be very easy for an adversary to fabricate
a set of desired data. A logical solution to this problem is to collect the
data randomly. Shaking a device and collecting the movement data using
the device’s internal accelerometer is a simple and intuitive way of creating
an unpredictable, one-time use secret. Two mobile devices that are physi-
cally held together and shaken are expected to come up with very similar
measurements. These can then be compared, with the intent of pairing the
corresponding devices only if the measurements are determined to be similar.
In order to evaluate the similarity between two sets of measurements, we
explore two different similarity measures. The first measure uses time series
analysis techniques on the data to produce a final value between 0 and 1. This
value is large for two sets that are similar and small otherwise. The second
measure compresses the data from three dimensions into one and projects
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the resulting vectors onto a predetermined number of randomly generated
uniform vectors. Two final vectors are constructed based on the directions of
the projections, and the Hamming distance between these two final vectors
is used as the similarity measure between the two original measurement sets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses
related work as well as some key differences between that work and this work.
Section 3 introduces our new method that uses Hamming distance. Section
4 describes the iOS application (which will be referred to as the ’app’ from
here on) used to collect movement data. Sections 5 and 6 go in depth into
the implementation of the app, how the two different measures analyze the
collected data, the results from experiments performed by various users, and
our interpretation of these results. Finally, the paper concludes with future
work in Section 7 and the conclusion in Section 8.
2 Related Work
The main inspiration for this project came from work done by Mayrhofer
and Gellersen who created a key verification method and a key construction
method, both based on simultaneous shaking of mobile devices, called ShaVe
and ShaCK respectively [8].
ShaVe works in the following way. First, a secret key is generated using
the Diffie-Hellman key agreement over a wireless channel [3]. Next, two de-
vices are shaken together, and the collected acceleration data is exchanged
between the devices using an Interlock protocol [9]. This data is then ana-
lyzed using a coherence measure which determines whether or not the previ-
ously generated secret key will be adopted by the two devices as the secret
key for a secure communication session.
The method to compute the coherence measure used in the implementa-
tion of ShaVe was adopted from work done by Lester et al. [7]. Given two
m × 3 matrices A and B as input, where A and B are two different time
series, the method returns a coherence value, Cxy, that is a measure of the
similarity between A and B in the frequency domain. A and B represent the
data collected during the shaking session undergone by device A and device
B respectively, and m is the number of samples collected by each device. It
is likely that the two devices will be imperfectly aligned during a given shak-
ing session; to account for this, Eqn. 1 is used on both A and B to obtain
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rotation invariant vector representations of each matrix.
~A =
√
(AX)2 + (AY )2 + (AZ)2 (1)
~A and ~B are split into n averaged slices where slice k is denoted by ~Ak.
Mayrhofer and Gellersen use overlapping slices in their implementation, but
we did not. For a particular frequency f , Discrete Fourier Transform coeffi-
cients xk(f) and yk(f) (Eqn. 2) are computed to be used in the cross-power
spectra equation Pxy(f) (Eqn. 3), which is in turn used in the magnitude
squared coherence equation Cxy(f) (Eqn. 4)
1.












Note that h(t) = 1−cos(2πt/w)
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is the standard von-Hann window, and ȳk(f)
denotes the complex conjugate of yk(f). If f is varied from 0 to a maximum
value called fmax, the various values of Cxy(f) computed for the different f ’s
can be averaged to come up with the final coherence value Cxy. Mayrhofer







But since there is a finite number of values in A and B (that is, the data is








If the Cxy computed using the above method on a given A and B is above a
threshold θ, we conclude that device A and device B were shaken together.
Otherwise, we conclude that device A and device B were not shaken together.
1This is a corrected version of the equation published in [8].
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ShaCK, on the other hand, starts with the shaking of two devices held
together and works in real time to extract feature vectors from the collected
acceleration data. These feature vectors are exchanged via an interactive
cryptographic protocol, and as soon as a sufficient number of matching vec-
tors are exchanged, a shared secret key can be constructed using the matching
vectors. Since the secret key is assembled over the duration of the shaking
session, it is clear that ShaCK allows users to undertake shorter shaking ses-
sions at the expense of constructing a weaker key than would be constructed
if the users were to shake for a longer duration. Under the assumptions that
(1) the average user does not want to shake devices for any longer than ab-
solutely necessary, and (2) the average user does not understand the security
implications of a weaker key (and thus is willing to trade security for faster
key construction), it can be further assumed that the average user is likely
to take full advantage of the flexibility of this protocol. This is potentially a
large problem because even the strongest security guarantees for a given pro-
tocol will not protect a user that does not use the protocol as it is intended to
be used. ShaCK is assumed to generate 7 bits of entropy per second regard-
less of the duration of the shaking session, but this is a very questionable
assumption. Consider a shaking session that lasts s seconds. There is no
way to guarantee the shaking that occurs between second i − 1 and second
i is independent from the shaking that occurs between second i and second
i+ 1 for any i up to s− 1. Therefore, it would be more reasonable to assume
that ShaCK generates 7 bits of entropy during the first second of shaking
and e bits of entropy during each subsequent second of shaking where e is
inversely proportional to s. Future work on this project might determine
an actual value for e and/or a relationship between the shaking that occurs
during neighboring time segments in the shaking session as a whole; either of
these discoveries would certainly help to provide better entropy guarantees.
Mayrhofer and Gellersen conclude their work by discussing a user study
they performed that shows their authentication methods robustly differenti-
ate between devices shaken together and shaken independently. Additionally,
this user study demonstrated that their methods are easy to learn, feasible to
implement on mobile devices, and secure against adversaries with full control
over a wireless channel.
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3 NewMethod: Random Projections and Ham-
ming Distance
The high level idea behind this new approach is the following. Consider
two devices that have been shaken together. The resulting xk(f) and yk(f)
vectors from running the coherence method (i.e. the data sets after the
FFT function has been applied, but before either the cross-power spectra or
magnitude squared coherence functions have been applied) should be very
close together, and thus, the probability of generating a random uniform
vector that falls somewhere between them in space is very low. Another
way to see this is by considering the projections of xk(f) and yk(f) onto a
random uniform vector. If this random uniform vector is between xk(f) and
yk(f), then the two projections will have opposite signs, but if this random
uniform vector is either above or below both xk(f) and yk(f), then the two
projections will have the same sign. Given xk(f) and yk(f) that are close,
the probability that the two projections will have the same sign is very high.
If two devices have not been shaken together, xk(f) and yk(f) will not be
close, so it is much more likely that a random uniform vector will fall between
the corresponding xk(f) and yk(f) vectors, and the probability that the two
projections will have the same sign is low.
For obvious reasons, using only one random uniform vector will not yield
strong results, so we generate many vectors and project both xk(f) and yk(f)
onto each one. The goal is to use the fraction of projection pairs with the
same sign over the total number of projection pairs to determine whether two
devices have been shaken together or separately. By representing the sign
of a given projection with a binary value, we create two binary vectors, one
storing the signs of the projections of xk(f) and one storing the signs of the
projections of yk(f). We then compute the Hamming distance between these
two vectors in order to compare the signs of the projections. The fraction
of same sign projection pairs over the total number of projection pairs will
be large for devices that have been shaken together, and the fraction of
same sign projection pairs over the total number of projection pairs will be
small for devices that have been shaken separately. This technique is of
interest because there are protocols that can perform key agreement based
on two parties each holding one of two strings that are close in Hamming
distance [4, 5, 1, 2].
We can also think about Hamming distance geometrically. Let the angle
6
between the xk(f) (or yk(f) without loss of generality) vector be φ, and let
the arbitrary random uniform vector we wish to project onto be ~d. Using the
dot product representation
xk(f) · ~d = ‖xk(f)‖‖~d‖ cosφ
one can see that the sign of cosφ is the sign of the projection of xk(f) onto ~d.
Furthermore, the relative Hamming distance between the two binary vectors
discussed above can be represented by φ
π
. This is true based on the following.
Consider two vectors in R2 with angle ψ between them; for simplicity, let
one vector be the x unit vector, and let the other vector be some vector
in the positive portion of the y-plane. A random line somewhere in the
positive portion of the y-plane and that travels through the origin has π
equally likely positions it could take, so the probability that a random line
falls between these two vectors is ψ
π
. This argument may not seem relevant
to our purposes since we are clearly not working in a two dimensional space,
but we can extend this argument from two dimensions to higher dimensions
by applying a rotation to any higher dimensional space that brings one vector
to the x axis and the other vector to the xy-plane. The resulting zeros in all
dimensions except the first and second will have no impact on the first two
dimensions.
4 The Application
The app used to collect movement data is currently only compatible with
the iOS platform and can only successfully collect data using devices with a
built-in accelerometer. Thus, the app is limited to running on the iPhone,
iPod Touch, and fourth and fifth generation iPod Nanos at present.
Immediately after starting the app, the user is prompted to either create
a new Dropbox account or log in to an existing one; data collected during a
shaking session is written to a file which can then be uploaded to Dropbox,
a website that enables users to store and share files. Once linked with a
Dropbox account, the user must specify the shaking duration (in seconds),
user posture while shaking, and sampling rate (in hertz) that will be used in
an upcoming shaking session. The default settings are ten seconds, sitting
posture, and 50 hertz, but users can select a longer shaking duration of twenty
seconds, a standing posture, or either a slower sampling rate of twenty-five
hertz or a faster sampling rate of 100 hertz. The user can begin a shaking
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session with another device as soon as identical settings have been selected
on both devices.
Once a shaking session has been completed, each of the two participat-
ing devices contains a text file of approximately selected frequency × se-
lected duration samples, where one sample consists of an acceleration mea-
surement in the X dimension, an acceleration measurement in the Y dimen-
sion, and an acceleration measurement in the Z dimension. Each measure-
ment is somewhere in the range of (−2.1, 2.1). Each text file is named with
the device’s unique ID, the user’s name (as entered by the user before be-
ginning a shaking session), the user’s selected session settings, the date, and
the time. Finally, the user is given the option to upload the file in his/her
device (the file is automatically deleted after the upload) or to start a new
shaking session with the same settings (the file is automatically deleted be-
fore the new shaking session begins). Alternatively, the user can go back to
the previous screen using the button on the Navigation Bar if he/she wishes
to select new settings.
5 Implementation
Using MATLAB, we implemented the coherence measure described in Sec-
tion 2 and the Hamming distance measure described in Section 3. Once
the user has performed a shaking session, uploaded the collected data to
Dropbox from both devices, and downloaded the corresponding text files
from Dropbox to a computer, the user can then run the MATLAB program,
DataEvaluation.m. Let a data set be defined as one m× 3 matrix represent-
ing the recorded movement of a given device in an arbitrary shaking session,
and let an experiment be defined as p consecutive shaking sessions all using
the same settings; thus, an experiment results in a total of 2p data sets where
p data sets come from device A, and the remaining p data sets come from
device B.
5.1 MATLAB Code
The program begins by asking the user to specify how they would like to
evaluate the available data sets. The current output options include the
following:
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• A set of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves [6] created by
applying the coherence measure to multiple experiments performed by
multiple users.
• One ROC curve created by applying the coherence measure to one
experiment performed by one user.
• One ROC curve created by applying the Hamming distance measure
to the same individual experiment mentioned in the bullet above.
• A graphical display of an application of MATLAB’s built-in Procrustes
transformation to the same individual experiment above.
The user is also asked to provide some values that will be used by the differ-
ent measures such as the number of slices to split the time series into (used in
both coherence and Hamming distance evaluations) and the maximum fre-
quency used as the upper bound in the summation that computes the final
coherence value (coherence only).
The code reads in text files from a specified directory under the assump-
tion that the files are sorted in alphabetical order within the directory. Sort-
ing the files in this manner ensures that for a given experiment, all the data
sets from device A are above all the data sets from device B (without loss of
generality), and all the data sets from device A (B) are further sorted by the
time of day that the data was collected. In other words, as long as the files
are sorted alphabetically, data set i’s correct match is data set i + p (where







DataSet1’s correct match is DataSet4, DataSet2’s correct match is DataSet5,
and DataSet3’s correct match is DataSet6. Note that the actual file names
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consist of more data than the file names in the above example, but these
were shortened for simplicity. The term correct match denotes the pairing of
two data sets such that one data set came from device A, one data set came
from device B, and the two data sets were collected during the same shaking
session where device A was shaken with device B. It is very important to
pay attention to this assumption because both the creation of ROC curves
and the implementation of the Procrustes transformation rely on the proper
matching of data sets. It is possible to properly match data sets based on the
time at which they are collected (similar to how the Bump pairing protocol
works [10]), and this approach could be explored in future work on this
project in order to eliminate the need for this assumption.
5.2 ROC Curves from Coherence
An ROC curve depicting the application of the coherence measure to an
arbitrary experiment is created in the following way. The program iterates
through the data sets in a specified directory, and it matches each data set
with every other data set exactly once where order does not matter (that is,
after data set i has been matched with data set j, data set j will not get
matched with data set i later in the iteration). Thus, for p shaking sessions
(i.e. 2p data sets), there will be p(2p−1) total pairs, of which p are correctly
matched and 2p(p− 1) are incorrectly matched. For each pairing of files, the
coherence measure is applied to the files’ corresponding matrices and results





0 if the files are incorrectly matched
1 if the files are correctly matched
All of the vectors are appended together to create a p(2p − 1) × 2 matrix
that is used to calculate the false positive and true positive rates for that
experiment; these will be defined shortly. A threshold θ is varied from a
minimum value of θmin to a maximum value of θmax. For each value of
θ, the program iterates through the coherence matrix and compares each
Cxy to θ. If Cxy ≥ θ, then it is asserted that the two matrices associated
with that particular Cxy came from two devices that were shaken together,
and it is asserted that the two matrices associated with that particular Cxy
came from two devices that were not shaken together otherwise. Next, the
corresponding b is considered in order to determine whether this assertion is
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a true or false result. Let a true positive be defined as an assertion that two
devices were shaken together when a particular Cxy’s corresponding b = 1;
that is, an assertion that two devices were shaken together when they were
actually shaken together. Let a false positive be defined as an assertion that
two devices were shaken together when b = 0, a true negative be defined as
an assertion that two devices were not shaken together when b = 0, and a
false negative be defined as an assertion that two devices were not shaken
together when b = 1. Thus, the false positive rate is the fraction of false
positives out of the total negatives, and the true positive rate is the fraction
of true positives out of the total positives. Finally, the ROC curve is created
by graphing the true positive rate versus the false positive rate for each θ.
5.3 ROC Curves from Hamming Distance
There are some key differences between the creation of an ROC curve de-
picting the application of the Hamming distance measure to an arbitrary
experiment and the creation of an ROC curve depicting coherence analysis.
The most obvious difference is the lack of final coherence values to compare
to the varying values of θ. Instead, this approach uses the coherence method
to obtain the xk(f) and yk(f) vectors (as described in Sections 2 and 3), and
after multiplying these complex vectors by their respective complex conju-
gates to get real-valued vectors, projects these vectors onto each of r random
uniform vectors where r is specified by the user. Let a projection pair be
defined as the projections of xk(f) and yk(f) onto the same random uniform
vector. Since these r vectors are generated randomly, the final ROC curve
looks slightly different each time this function is called. To account for this
randomness, the code performs r projection pairs a total of r times and av-
erages the results. We chose to perform the r projection pairs r times for
the simple reason that we did not wish to introduce another parameter (cer-
tainly, anyone implementing this work in the future may adjust this number
as they see fit for their own purposes).
Throughout a single iteration of r projection pairs, two binary vectors,
~b1 and ~b2, are built up where each entry in each respective vector represents
whether the projection of xk(f) (yk(f)) onto each random vector is positive
or negative. Once all of the r projections pairs for that iteration have been
completed, and thus ~b1 and ~b2 have been completed, the program computes
the Hamming distance between ~b1 and ~b2 to determine how many projection
pairs had the same sign and how many projection pairs had opposite signs.
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In other words, consider row i in ~b1 and ~b2. If ~b1 and ~b2 both have either
a 0 or a 1 (where 0 represents a negative projection, and 1 represents a
positive projection) on this row, the number of same sign projection pairs
is incremented. However, if ~b1 has a 1 (0) and ~b2 has a 0 (1) on this row,
the number of opposite sign projection pairs is incremented. The final value
that gets compared to the varying values of θ is the fraction of same sign
projection pairs over the total number of projection pairs.
5.4 The Procrustes Transformation
The Procrustes transformation is useful because it finds a linear function that
optimally brings two sets of data points in Rn into alignment. MATLAB’s
built-in Procrustes transformation takes two matrices A and B, determines
a linear transformation to apply to the values in B in order to conform them
to the values in A, and returns both the transformation and the resulting
matrix Z from applying the linear transformation to B. Currently, DataE-
valuation.m reads in the text files from a specified directory, matches the
data sets based on user input declaring whether to match the data sets ”cor-
rectly” or ”incorrectly,” and outputs a set of graphs that display A, B, and
Z. The correct matching case pairs each data set with its proper match while
the incorrect matching case pairs each data set with the data set one index
below it in the directory. In other words, under the assumption described
earlier in this section, the incorrect matching case pairs each data set with
another data set collected by the same device but during a different shaking
session. While this code is not currently used with either the coherence or
Hamming distance measures, it could be used to obtain rotation invariant
matrices that could later be compared using variations of those two methods.
This will be discussed further in the Future Work section.
6 Testing and Analysis
In order to test the ability of the coherence and Hamming distance measures
to successfully classify devices as shaken together or shaken separately, we
performed an initial experiment with one user, p = 10 (number of shaking
sessions in the experiment), and using the default app settings mentioned
in Section 3; we call these files the Original Test Files and will refer to this
initial experiment as the Original Experiment. This experiment, as well as
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Figure 1: ROC Curve using n = 20 and fmax = 5.
all subsequent experiments discussed in this section, were performed using
an iPhone 4 and an iPod Touch, both running iOS 5.1.
6.1 Initial Testing of the Coherence Measure
After running the coherence analysis code using the Original Test Files many
times with varying the values of both n and fmax, we found some of the
strongest results, which are depicted in Figure 1. This figure shows the
resulting ROC curve from applying the coherence measure to each of the
possible data set pairs in the Original Experiment. According to the default
settings, a sampling rate of 50 Hz and a shaking duration of ten seconds
implies each of the twenty data sets have approximately 500 samples. The
ROC curve in this figure was created by utilizing the coherence measure
with n = 20 slices (i.e. a window size of approximately 25 samples) and a
maximum frequency of fmax = 5 Hz. Each point on the graph represents the
true positive rate (TPR) vs. the false positive rate (FPR) as calculated for
a particular threshold value θ where θ is varied in increments of .1 over the
range of .1 to 1 to make up the whole graph. As expected, larger values of θ
yield a smaller FPR, but this comes at the expense of a smaller TPR as well.
In Figure 1, θ = .4, θ = .5, and θ = .6 all yield a perfect 1 : 0 TPR to FPR
ratio, or the maximum area under the curve (AUC). For n = 10, the best θ’s
(that is, the θ’s with the largest AUC’s) occurred between .3 and .5 for both
small and large fmax’s, and for n = 5, the best θ’s occurred between .4 and .5
for large fmax’s and between .8 and .9 for small fmax’s. From this data, one
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Sampling Rate (Hz) User Posture Shaking Duration (sec)
Experiment 1 100 Sitting 10
Experiment 2 50 Sitting 10
Experiment 3 50 Sitting 20
Experiment 4 50 Standing 10
Experiment 5 25 Sitting 10
Table 1: Experiment settings used in robustness testing
can conclude that smaller values of fmax result in the initial decrease of TPR
occurring at larger values of θ. In other words, smaller values of fmax result
in smaller overall coherence values. The largest possible θ with the largest
possible AUC is most desirable; the larger the threshold, the less likely it is
to classify two truly dissimilar data sets as similar, but the threshold cannot
be too large otherwise even the truly similar data sets will be classified as
dissimilar.
6.2 Robustness Testing of the Coherence Measure
Figure 2: Exp. 1 Figure 3: Exp. 2
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Figure 4: Exp. 3 Figure 5: Exp. 4
Figure 6: Exp. 5
We performed further robustness testing by asking ten different users to each
perform five different experiments, each with p = 10 shaking sessions. The
various experiment settings are highlighted in Table 1. Each of the users
found the app easy to use and were able to successfully perform the exper-
iments with little to no instruction. The following discussion encompasses
ROC curves created with n = 20 slices and fmax = 5 Hz, the same values as
used above with the ROC curve for the Original Test Files.
When comparing the effect of user posture in the ROC curves of Exper-
iment 2 and Experiment 4, one can easily see that Experiment 4 has faster
decreasing TPR’s than Experiment 2. One observation made while watching
users perform the various experiments is that when shaking while sitting,
most users tend to rest their shaking arm on a nearby surface or in their lap.
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This unconscious action could potentially be causing users to unknowingly
limit both their shaking range and motion. In contrast, when shaking while
standing, users tend to create a larger shaking range with a more vigorous
motion due to the lack of physical restriction in the shaking vicinity. It is
possible that the difference in the shaking ranges and/or motions could be
responsible for the more rapidly decreasing TPR’s in the standing case.
When comparing the effect of sampling rate in the ROC curves of Exper-
iments 1, 2, and 5, we noted that the AUC’s all start decreasing around the
same (small) FPR values in Experiment 5 but that the AUC’s start decreas-
ing at different FPR values in Experiments 1 and 2; that is, the FPR’s drop
from 1 to values < .2 for small values of θ in the slowest sampling rate exper-
iment while the FPR’s decrease from 1 much more steadily in the medium
and fastest sampling rate experiments (one can easily see from the graphs
that the FPR’s touch values between 1 and .2 in Experiments 1 and 2 but
not in Experiment 5). This is the expected result because a slower sampling
rate means fewer samples, which in turn implies smaller values of fmax, and
as discussed previously, smaller values of fmax result in smaller overall coher-
ence values. Therefore, the probability of falsely classifying dissimilar data
sets (with a slow sampling rate) as similar becomes small at small values of
θ, whereas the probability of falsely classifying dissimilar data sets (with a
medium or fast sampling rate) as similar becomes small at medium to large
values of θ.
When comparing the effect of shaking duration in the ROC curves of
Experiments 2 and 3, it is clear that a longer shaking duration produces
larger AUC’s. In fact, Experiment 3 yielded the best results out of all five
experiments. This is the expected result since larger data sets are more
difficult for an adversary to successfully replicate. Unfortunately, a longer
shaking duration is not a user-friendly option for real-world applications of
this work; most people would not want to shake two devices for twenty
seconds or more to simply initialize a transaction. From observing Figures 2
to 6, almost all users manage to obtain at least one large AUC for some value
of θ in each of the experiments. This indicates that the coherence measure
can robustly differentiate between devices shaken together and devices shaken
independently.
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6.3 Testing the Hamming Distance Measure
To test the performance of the Hamming distance measure, we go back to
using the Original Test Files. However, we now vary θ in increments of .01
from .85 to 1. Using the same n = 20 as before and projecting onto r = 50
random vectors, we found that there is a much more gradual initial decrease
in TPR here than in any of the ROC curves for coherence (see Figure 7).
Note that we experimented with larger values of r, but they made little
to no difference in the results. The largest AUC’s are smaller in this case
than the largest AUC’s in the coherence analysis case, and as evidenced by
the new range of values for θ, they occur for very high values of θ. The
high values of θ can be attributed to the fact that the number of same sign
projection pairs is overwhelmingly larger than the number of opposite sign
projection pairs regardless of whether a data set pair is a true match. This
is a surprising result since the expectation was that data sets coming from
separate shaking sessions would yield xk(f) and yk(f) vectors that were very
far apart from each other. Since a greater distance between arbitrary xk(f)
and yk(f) vectors would result in a high probability of generating random
vectors between them, more projections should go in opposite directions for
improperly matched data set pairs. Currently, we are generating random
vectors with all entries chosen uniformly at random from the interval [−1, 1],
but it is possible that improvement in the generation of random vectors could
improve the overall AUC’s. Regardless of whether r is increased or decreased
Figure 7: ROC Curve using n = 20 and
r = 50.
Figure 8: ROC Curve using n = 10 and
r = 50.
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while n stays the same, the AUC’s follow the same general pattern where they
begin to decrease from 1 at θ = .9 (and where the FPR is around .3). If n is
decreased while r remains static, the AUC’s increase significantly, achieving
areas close to 1 for n = 10 (see Figure 8). However, if n is increased while r
remains the same, the AUC’s worsen such that they begin to decrease from
1 at θ = .86 (and where the FPR is around .4) for n = 30. It is also worth
noting that for smaller values of n, the FPR achieves higher values for the
starting value of θ = .85 (for n = 10, the FPR is close to .9, for n = 20,
the FPR is close to .7, and for n = 30, the FPR is close to .5). This makes
sense because the more slices an arbitrary time series is split into, the fewer
samples fit into a given slice, and that implies the FFT function is applied
more frequently but to smaller segments since it is applied to each individual
slice. Splitting a time series into fewer slices should naturally result in more
false positives since bigger slices provide less accuracy. Overall, since it is
possible to adjust the parameters of the Hamming distance evaluation to
obtain AUC’s very close to 1, it can be concluded that this measure robustly
differentiates between devices shaken together and devices shaken separately.
7 Future Work
This project can be taken in many different directions in the future. The
most obvious, but completely separate, direction is to investigate ShaCK
and either improve it or come up with a better alternative to constructing a
secure key. A more relevant direction is exploring the possible extension of
coherence analysis from R to R3. By taking two data sets and immediately
transforming them into rotation invariant vectors, a lot of entropy is lost. The
Procrustes transformation can help here; after applying this transformation,
time series analysis could be performed on the individual X, Y , and Z vectors
of the two now rotation invariant matrices resulting in a final coherence value
for each dimension.
In terms of future robustness testing, it would be interesting to see if data
sets differ based on the hand in which the user shakes the devices; shaking
movements may vary depending on whether the user is shaking the devices
in his or her dominant versus non-dominant hand. To improve the usability,
this work could be extended to include devices that are not compatible with
iOS. One very important open question to consider is the following: how is
this work affected on a device where the accelerometer is not performing as
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expected? Perhaps the device has been unintentionally damaged somehow,
or it is simply old. It may also be possible for an adversary to open a device
and alter the accelerometer to behave in a certain way. This is a legitimate
concern because there may not be any outward signs that a given accelerom-
eter is behaving erratically, and without proper warning, the average user
would have no reason to suspect anything was wrong.
8 Conclusion
In this work, we addressed one potential solution to the problem of how to
securely pair mobile devices that wish to communicate with each other. In
our approach, the mobile devices simultaneously undergo a shared experience
and subsequently use data collected during this shared experience to verify
a previously exchanged session key. We defined a shared experience to be
the act of physically holding two devices together and shaking them for a
specified amount of time. We introduced and explained the iOS app used
to collect data during a shaking session using the accelerometer in an iOS
compatible device. We then examined two separate methods that we claim
can robustly classify devices as shaken together or shaken independently.
Both of these methods, when applied to a pair of data sets collected using
the app, return a positive, real value that gets compared to a threshold value
to determine the classification of the devices in question. The act of holding
two devices together and shaking them is both easy to learn and easy put
into practice, as shaking is a natural human motion. Users would not be
required to learn any complex movements, remember any type of password
or secret information, or buy any additional equipment beyond the mobile
device itself. This ease of use combined with the positive results discussed
in this paper make it plausible to consider an extension of this work into
real-world scenarios. While the current results of this work are promising,
there is a lot more to be done to improve and/or extend these findings.
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